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NINETEENTH CENTURY JUDICIAL THOUGHT
CONCERNING CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS
The adoption of the first amendment to the Federal Constitution
assured Americans that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise there-
of. . . ."I This clause was included in the amendment because of
two public realizations: (1) that a federal establishment of religion
would be unsuccessful, since the religious sympathies of the people
were divided among a number of sects, each in itself composed of
far less than a majority of the voters ;2 and (2) that force cannot
and ought not control the religious opinions of men.
Although this provision did not bind the states, 4 by 1833 all the
state constitutions but one5 had provisions prohibiting establishment
of religion and guaranteeing freedom of conscience.0 Since legal
history is peculiarly valuable in settling live constitutional issues, an
historical approach to Church-State problems should enlighten more
than mere pursuers of esoteric data; therefore, discussion in this
Note will be limited chiefly to the determination of what the nine-
teenth century courts considered the proper relationship between
the Church and the State.
The two Church-State relationships most often advocated as
proper throughout American history are each traceable to some
alleged intention present at the constitutional convention of 1787.
One view, propounded by Thomas Jefferson' and James Madison"
favored complete separation. The reasoning behind it seems to be
that since man's opinions are a naturally private matter, the State
should penalize him in no way for holding them. Control of action,
not thought, is the province of the State. If the State connects
itself with religion in any way, it attempts to control opinion. The
other view, held generally by churchmen, stressed the predominant
Christianity of the delegates to the constitutional convention, and
1. U. S. Const. amend. I.
2. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 1879 (1833).
3. Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333, 342 (1890) (dictum).
4. Permoli v. First Municipality, 44 U. S. (3 How.) 589 (1845).
5. The New Hampshire constitution provided then and still provides
that legislative authorization may be given to the towns to support "public
Protestant teachers of piety, religion, and morality. . . ." N. H. Const. Pt. 1,
art. 6.
6. See I Stokes, Church and State in the United States 427-45 (1950).
7. Jefferson believed that the first amendment created a "wall of sepa-
ration" between Church and State and prevented any intermingling of
government with religion. Padover, The Complete Jefferson 518-19 (1943).
8. Padover, The Complete Madison 308-09 (1953).
asserted that they intended Christianity to be the religion of the
nation, even though-they prohibited its formal establishment or the
interference -with the religion of non-Christians.0
Even if Jefferson's "wall of separation" were erected, it could
never be impregnable so long as subjects of the State have religious
feeling. Where the inevitable points of contact erupt into conflict,
the courts must determine the proper Church-State relationship.
-CASES SUPPORTING AN INFORMALLY ESTABLISHED CHRISTIANITY
Just as there are limitations on freedom of speech or on any
other constitutional freedom, there must be limitations on freedom
of religion. Belief that action is divinely dictated cannot justify
criminal conduct if government is to govern. 0 Yet to retain re-
ligious freedom, conduct should not be judged criminal solely be-
cause it is prohibited by a religious doctrine. The standard for
determining which acts are crimnial must be non-religious or the
State attempts to force religious standards on its subjects.
Lindenmuller v. People" upheld a conviction for defendant's
desecration of the Sabbath by his staging a dramatic performance
on Sunday. The court held that the act of the legislature punishing
such conduct did not violate the New York constitutional provision
granting free exercise of religion,1- since that provision granted
toleration to all other religions, but still left Christianity unaffected
as the people's religion. Since the State recognized the general
Christianity of the people, it could preserve their customs from
desecration.Few of the other cases upholding Sunday laws justify them
by specific statement that Christianity is the informal State religion.
Most courts sustain su6h laws as mere exercises of police power
requiring that people be free from work one day in seven."3
The reasoning in the Lindenmuller case is reminiscent of that
used by Chief Justice Kent in People v. Ruggles.'" Ruggles was
indicted and convicted for contemptuously reviling the Christian
religion. His conviction was upheld on the ground that by ma-
9. Not all ecclesiastics took this position. Among the exceptions the
Baptists are notable. Thei desire, the State's utter disconnection from the
Church, since they thought religion would benefit by it. I Stokes, Church
and State in the United States 112-14 (1950).
10. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145 (1878).
11. 33 Barb. 548 (N.Y. 1861).
12. N.Y. Const. art. 1, § 3 (1846).
13. E.g., State ex re. Walker v. Judge of Section A, 39 La. Ann. 13-
(1887) ; Ex parte Andrews, 18 Cal. *678 (1861) ; Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio
St. *387, *391 (1853) (dictum); accord, State v. Ludwig, 21 Minn. 202
(1875).
14. 8 Johns. R. 290 (N.Y. 1811).
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liciously ridiculing Christ he had committed the common law crime
of blasphemy, which still existed despite the New York constitu-
tional provision allowing free exercise of religion.1 According to
Kent that provision did not prevent the courts from recognizing
offenses against religion. He denies, however, the necessity to pro-
tect similarly the religion of Mohamet or that of the grand Lama,
since "the case assumes that we are a christian people, and the
morality of the country is deeply ingrafted upon christianity, and
not upon the doctrines or worship of those imposters." 10
Thus Lindenmuller and Ruggles stand for the proposition that
the State can recognize and specially protect the religion of the
majority, while extending mere toleration to the worship of the
minority.
The rationale behind the State's preferment of Christianity is
more fully explained in Updegraph v. Commonwealth," an 1822
blasphemy case from Pennsylvania. To the charge that punishment
of blasphemy is religious persecution the court answered that the
crime against God was not being punished, only the crime against
man. Deriding Christianity is a crime against man because the
morals of the people are Christian. Since it is the State's duty to
protect morality, it must protect Christianity.
Implicit in this reasoning, however, is the assumption that the
State has the right to protect morality even if based solely on re-
ligion. If the only justification for State enforcement of a moral
precept lies in its foundation upon the religion of the majority,
punishment for violation of that precept is punishment inflicted
on religious grounds.
The theory that Christianity is this nation's religion has not
been immune from recognition by the United States Supreme
Court. In Vidal v. Ex'rs of Girard,8 though the Court sustained
provisions of a will which established a school for orphans on con-
dition that no ecclesiastics be allowed on the school grounds, there
was dictum in the opinion that Christianity is part of Pennsylvania's
common law in the sense "that its divine origin and truth are
admitted, and therefore it is not to be maliciously and openly
reviled and blasphemed against, to the annoyance of believers or the
injury of the public."'19 Though the Court was merely construing
Pennsylvania law, the language used approved the Kent theory that
15. N. Y. Const. art. 38 (1777).
16. 8 Johns. R. at 295.
17. 11 S. & R. *394 (1824).
18. 43 U. S. (2 How.) 126 (1844).
19. Id. at 198.
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the religion of the majority should be preferred by the State at least
in protecting it from malicious criticism. What is more distressing,
the words quoied imply that the Court, itself an instrumentality
of the State, is capable of making a distinction between true and
false religion.
The reasoning used to support Bible reading in public schools
was not often so openly pro-Christian as Kent's. Since the plaintiff
in such cases was usually Roman Catholic, determination of Chris-
tian supremacy would be immaterial. When a Roman .Catholic
objects to the use of the King James version of the Bible in public
schools, he does so on the ground that the State teaches sectarian
doctrine. Few nineteenth century courts agreed with him.
In Hart v. School District of Sharp"vilWeO the court disagreed
with the Catholic plaintiff in such a case. Since the moral system
of the country was based on Christianity, the Bible was a proper
book to be used in teaching morals to the children. Any version
'might be used, since it was beyond the court's power to decide
which translation was correct. No State support of religion was
present, since the State in teaching Christian morals was merely
preserving itself. By recognizing the "best" moral system the State
did not make a theological judgment, merely a secular determina-
tion of what would best perpetuate society.
The history of the nineteenth century courts shows a predomi-
nance of sympathy toward Christianity. In some cases this is Ex-
plicitly revealed and justified as a preservation of American morals.
In others devious justification for.obviously pro-Christian laws is
attempted by use of seemingly secular police power rationalizations.
Where the expressed sympathy appears, the court should be
commended for its honesty, but condemned for its judicial estab-
lishment of one sect as superior to others. If the State is neither
to establish a religion nor prohibit its free exercise, any expression
of judicial sympathy for one type of religion is irrelevant. When-
ever the expression is a necessary premise to a decision favoring
Christians or disfavoring non-Christians, the State through its
courts supports Christianity.
It has been seen, however, that these courts attempt to justify
their preference of Christianity as an-exception to constitutional
limitations requiring Church-State separation. This they do by
noting the obvious necessity for government to preserve morality.
The difficulty of the argument, which on the surface seems valid,
20. 2 'Lanc. L. Rev. 346 (Pa. county ct. 1885). See also Moore v.
Monroe, 64 Iowa 367, 20 N. W. 475 (1884).
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appears with the next step in reasoning. For some unproved and
seemingly unprovable reason morality for these courts equals the
moral teachings of the religion of the majority. Such a position re-
duces to the absurd the constitutional provisions which prohibit
establishment or hindrance of religion. According to this doctrine,
if the majority religiously believes freedom of conscience should not
be allowed, the State may disallow it, despite the constitutional
provision to the contrary. If the constitutional limitation is to retain
any meaning at all, the standard of morality enforced by the State
must be derived from a source other than religion. Though any
moral system the State established would greatly parallel the Chris-
tian ethic, establishment of the Christian ethic, itself, would include
some solely religious morals along with the civil morals necessary
to good government.
Where the reason for the existence of a particular taboo was
solely religious, many of the nenteenth century courts recognized
the need for basing their maintenance of religious custom on some
purely social and non-religious standard. This need can be seen in
the attempts to defend on specious social grounds the continued
punishment of blasphemers and Sabbath-desecrators.
CASES SUPPORTING SEPARATION WITHOUT PREFERENCE
State ex rel. Weiss v. School Board,21 another Bible reading
case, uses language approving the moral system taught by the
Bible.2 2 The case holds, however, that the Bible cannot constitu-
tionally be used as a text book in public schools because of its
sectarian nature. The book itself naturally tends to impart belief in
its divine origin. The reason for the constitutional prohibition of
State supported sectarian instruction23 is not State hostility toward
Church. Rather it is the wish to promote both civil good, by ridding
the school system of theological disputes, and religious good, by
protecting the parents' interest in religious education.
In the concurring opinion of Justice Orton concise explanation is
given this concept: "Religion needs no support from the state. It is
stronger and much purer without it .... The connection of church
and state corrupts religion and makes the state despotic. ' 2 4 Thus for
these judges complete separation is necessary for the benefit of both
government and religion. Religion is stronger when it is a movement
21. 76 Wis. 177 (1890).
22. Id. at 195.
23. Wis. Const. art X, § 3.
24. 76 Wis. at 221.
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of thought and not official force. Government thrives as religion
strengthens, since the Church promotes order.
Ex parte Newman,2 5 an 1858 case which held a California Sun-
day statute unconstitutional, explains the relation of religious lib-
erty to separation of Church and State. Religious liberty to Chief
Justice Terry demanded "a complete separation between Church
and State, and a perfect equality without distinction between all
religious sects."' 26 Justice Burnett in a concurring opinion em-
bellished this concept, pointing out that the constitutional provision
forbidding religious discrimination2 7 requires the legislature not to
breach man's inalienable right that religion, whether of the majority
or of the minority, should never be the sole foundation for prescrib-
ing conduct. This constitutional limitation on the State is based on
"the system of abstract justice (which... springs from the natural
relation and fitness of things).. ."21 For this court the State has
no right to conform its laws to the religious fervor of the majority.
Complete separation allows neither tolerance nor intolerance.
The nineteenth century case that best explains the need for com-
plete separation of Church and State is Board of Education v.
Minor.2 9 Plaintiff sought to enjoin the board from enforcing its
resolution to eliminate the use of the Bible in public school class-
rooms. The cotirt denied the injunction with a salvo of fine phrases
supporting the disconnection of government from religion. To Jus-
tice Welch, the writer of the opinion:
Legal Christianity is a solecism, a contradiction of terms.
When Christianity asks the aid of government beyond mere im-
partial protection, it denies itself. Its laws are divine, and not
human. Its essential interests lie beyond the reach and range of
human governments. United with government, religion never
rises above the merest superstition; united with religion, govern-
ment never rises above the merest despotism; and all history
shows us that the more widely and completely they are sepa-
rated, the better it is for both. 0
For this court religious subjects are matter with which it is in-
appropriate for governments to deal. Impartial protection is the
Church's only claim upon the State. The State is in the immediate
control of but a few men. Endowed with good judgment these men
may make decisions dependent on sense and reason. Religious con-
victions, however, are dependent on faith. Since faith is by nature
25.- 9 Cal. 502 (1858).
26. 9 CaL at 506.
27. CaL Cost. ar I, § 4.
28. 9 Cal. at 511.
29. 23, Ohio St 211 (1872).




a purely personal and individual basis for choice, the few controllers
of government cannot and must not choose religious concepts for
any individual.
Justice Welch argued that religion, used in its broadest sense
which includes every belief of every man concerning his relation to
God, is essential to good government as a means of producing the
best form of government. Because religion is essential to good
government, the best government needs the best religion among its
people. The people themselves, however, must have free choice of
religious concepts if the best religion is to flower. With a free field,
religious doctrines will join in intellectual, moral, and spiritual com-
bat. "The weakest-that is, the intellectually, morally, and spirit-
ually weakest-will go to the wall, and the best will triumph in the
end. This is the golden truth which it has taken the world eighteen
centuries to learn, and which has at last solved the terrible enigma
of 'church and state.' ",31 The form of religion which cannot exist
under equal and impartial protection from the government will and
should naturally die from its loss of the moral battle for man's
belief.
Addressing himself to American Christians generally, Justice
Welch cites the golden rule as a religious concept which should
eliminate any desire for State adoption of the religion of the ma-
jority. If Christians wish others to be treated as they themselves
would be treated, they cannot consistently ask that their religion
be supported here unless those of them who live in Egypt would ask
for State support of Islam, an unlikely event. Thus Christianity
itself teaches complete separation when the golden rule is applied
to Church-State relations.
Even for many of the complete separatists of the nineteenth
century the "impartial protection" given to all religions by the
State was impartial only in the sense that the various sects were
treated equally. The protection given was greater than that given
to the ordinary individual or corporation. The State, though pre-
ferring no sect, preferred religion in general by granting it privi-
leges which were withheld from other movements. This beneficent
protection included the exemption of religious organizations from
taxation, 32 the favorable environment that zoning laws built up
around churches, 33 and many other civil,3 4 criminal,3 5 and adminis-
trative aids.38 There were also limitations on Church power, 7 which
were necessary to prevent religious usurpation of secular life, but
31. Id. at 251.
32. See, e.g., N. J. Acts 1851, at 272.
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the legal atmosphere created by the State favored religion over
secularism.
Though most of these expressions of favor toward religion
were legislative rather than judicial, the courts consistently upheld
them as neither abridging religious freedom nor establishing re-
ligion. They reasoned that governmental patronage of religion was
no more than the payment of a debt. The Church, by teaching duty,
love, and morality diminished beyond estimation the State's ex-
pense in maintaining order. Since a natural function of religion
eliminated much of government's burden, the State eased the task
of the Church.38
The arguments used against the informal establishment of Chris-
tianity seem equally applicable to any informal establishment of re-
ligion in general. If the constitutional provisions aganist establish-
ment require the, State to treat, Christians and non-Christians
equally, the same provisions must require equal treatment for re-
ligionists and non-religionists. Since all men are not so fortunate as
to have religious feeling, the State should not penalize those who
have no faith by preferring religion to irreligion.
CONCLUSION
The Church-State problems for which these nineteenth century
courts sought answers are still unsolved. Whether Christianity
should be accepted by the State as an informally established re-
ligion is a question still unsettled in the minds of many.0 W1,rhat
privileges the Church may demand and what the State may grant
cannot be determined by looking at the words of constitutions alone.
The diverse Church-State conflicts are not soluble by a few am-
biguous words. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter has "stated, 0 the
general idea of separation of Church and State given by the first
amendment is only a vague goal, the clear recognition of which re-
33. See, e.g., N. C. Laws 1879, c. 232.
34. E.g., Act of July 5, 1838, § 18, 5 Stat. 259 provided for the employ-
ment of chaplains in the army.
35. E.g., Pennsylvania's Act of April 2, 1822, Pa. Acts 1821, c. 169 § 6
punishes disturbers of religious worship.
36. E.g., in 1865 Congress authorized the director of the mint to stamp
the motto "In God We Trust' on coins of the United States. 13 Stat. 518.
37. See Zoiman, American Church Law, §§ 167-69 (1933).
38. See Trustees of First Methodist Episcopal Church v. Atlanta, 76
Ga. 181 (1886) ; People ex reL Seminary of Our Lady of Angels v. Barber,
42 Hun. 27, 30 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1886) (dictum).
39. See IIl Stokes, Church and State in the United States 582-95(1950).
40. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 212(1948) (concurring opinion).
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quires reference to the wisdom and error of the past, if we are to
reach a satisfactory resolution of specific modern conflicts.
The judicial thought of the nineteenth century concerning
these problems has not solidified into settled doctrine. Though
modern courts seldom employ language favoring Christianity as
explicitly as did the biased Kent, implication of favor toward Chris-
tians is evident in many a seeming subterfuge of upheld police
power.
Recent opinions of the United States Supreme Court confuse
the old confusion past recognition. In 1947 without breaching the
wall of separation a New Jersey school board could pass a resolution
providing payment-for children's transportation to Catholic or pub-
lic schools but not providing for transportation to private or other
religious schools. 4 1 In 1948 the wall of separation was reinforced
in terms implying future disallowance of nearly all connection be-
tween Church and State.42 In 1952 because "we are a religious
people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being,"'4 , New
York was permitted to use State authority to promote impartial
religious education for its school childrefi.
Admitting that we must look to history to settle these inconsist-
encies does not choose history's best theory. The standard for choice
must be modern experience. Bias dressed as "truth" is an inapt
premise to a legal conclusion drawn by a free society. The truth
for the Russian government is atheism; for the Spanish government,
Catholicism. For the government of the middle ages the existence
of witches was a truth. The inconsistency of these "truths" shows
only that government is unqualified to distinguish truth from falsity
when judging matters of faith. No judgment can be made. The
choice of theory taken from history dictated by our modern love
of liberty must be complete abstention from either interfering with
or perferring Christianity or religion.
41. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947). It should be
noted that the New Jersey resolution was attacked not on the ground that
it discriminated in favor of Catholics but rather because it aided a religious
school. The facts of the case, nevertheless, remain facts.
42. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203
(1948).
43. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 313 (1952).
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